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Unused Arsenal: Iran's Secret Weapons Exposed

· 6 min read
Khalid Naami
Founder, Owner, and CEO at Dashboard Options

As the military conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States enters its fourth week, a detailed assessment published by the Israeli daily Maariv warns that Tehran is conserving its most advanced military technologies. The report, titled "The Secret Arsenal in Tehran: The Unactivated Weaponry Denying the West Sleep," details how the IRGC is intentionally maintaining a low-intensity war of attrition while keeping its next-generation jet-powered drones, heavy payload ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missile grids in reserve.

Unused Arsenal: Iran's Secret Weapons Exposed


The Secret Arsenal: Tapping the Unactivated Reserves​

Throughout the current hostilities, U.S. and Israeli intelligence have tracked the deployment of various Iranian ballistic platforms, including the Emad, Qiam, and Khorramshahr-4. However, the joint assessment from military analysts confirms that the IRGC has not yet deployed its primary strategic reserves.

By maintaining a large portion of its arsenal in secure, underground facilities, Iran is preserving its capability to conduct high-intensity operations if the conflict expands. The unactivated assets represent a strategic reserve designed to deter a full-scale U.S. invasion or attacks on Iran's internal leadership.


The Strategy: Low-Intensity War of Attrition​

The Ground Forces Commander of the IRGC, Mohammad Karami, stated that Iran is deliberately conducting a "low-intensity war of attrition" (حرب استنزاف منخفضة الحدة). This strategy is designed to achieve specific goals:

  • Resource Conservation: Using older or mass-produced missile families (like the Qiam and standard Emad) to exhaust Israeli air defense interceptors.
  • Economic Strain: Imposing continuous operational costs on Israel and the U.S. coalition without triggering a total, uncontrollable escalation.
  • Technological Reserve: Keeping high-value, maneuvering, and jet-powered platforms in reserve for later, more decisive phases of the conflict.

This approach forces the U.S. and Israel to maintain a high state of mobilization, consuming their defense budgets and interceptor stocks while Iran's primary strategic assets remain intact.


The Jet-Powered Vector: Shahed-238 vs. Shahed-136​

The most significant unused asset in the IRGC's drone inventory is the jet-powered Shahed-238. While the propeller-driven Shahed-136 has become a standard export platform, the Shahed-238 represents a major technological leap:

  • Turbojet Engine: Replacing the piston engine with a micro-turbojet, raising cruise speeds from 180 km/h to over 500 km/h.
  • Interception Difficulty: The higher speed reduces the reaction window for air defense radars, making it difficult for standard gun and missile systems to lock on.
  • Guidance Variety: Equipped with active radar, electro-optical, and passive anti-radiation seekers, allowing it to target air defense radars directly.

The Shahed-238 was first revealed in late 2024 and has not yet been deployed in active combat, remaining a key card in the IRGC's reserve.


The Heavy Ballistic Inventory: Haj Qasem and Khorramshahr-4​

In the ballistic missile sector, the IRGC has withheld two of its heaviest solid and liquid-fueled platforms:

  • The Haj Qasem Missile: A solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic missile carrying a 500 kg warhead. Its solid propellant allows for rapid launch cycles, reducing vulnerability to preemptive strikes.
  • The Khorramshahr-4 (Khaibar): A heavy liquid-fuel missile carrying a 1,500 kg warhead. While some early versions were used, the bulk of the Khorramshahr-4 arsenal has not been deployed, preserving a massive payload capacity that can destroy reinforced underground structures.

The preservation of these heavy platforms indicates that Iran's current launches represent only a fraction of its total payload capacity.


The Coastal Battery Shield: Protecting the Strait of Hormuz​

To secure the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGC has established a distributed network of anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) batteries along the southern coast. This network includes the Abu Mahdi long-range cruise missile, which has a range of over 1,000 km.

The U.S. Navy has conducted preemptive strikes along the coast to disable these launcher sites, recognizing the threat they pose to commercial and military vessels. However, because the launchers are highly mobile and hidden in underground bunkers, the core of the coastal defense system remains operational, ready to enforce a total blockade of the strait if ordered.


The Dual Chokepoint Risk: Bab el-Mandeb and Yemen​

The strategic calculation extends beyond the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, where Ansar Allah (the Houthis in Yemen) controls the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Under the leadership of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the group has prepared a maritime blockade plan:

  • Symmetrical Blockade: If the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the Houthis will close Bab el-Mandeb, shutting down the primary alternative route for global shipping.
  • Targeting Allied Assets: Using anti-ship ballistic missiles and sea-skimming drones to target commercial vessels attempting to bypass the Gulf blockade.

A simultaneous closure of both chokepoints would isolate the Suez Canal and disrupt a significant portion of global trade, creating an energy crisis that would affect Western economies.


The Regional Coalition Vectors: Iraq and Lebanon​

In addition to Yemen, the IRGC's attrition strategy relies on coordinated actions by coalition forces in Iraq and Lebanon. Factions in Iraq have expanded their targeting coordinates, while Hezbollah maintains its 150 daily rocket strikes in the north.

This multi-front coordination prevents the U.S. and Israel from concentrating their military assets on Iran itself. By forcing the coalition to defend multiple sectors simultaneously, Iran is able to sustain the low-intensity conflict without exposing its domestic infrastructure to concentrated attack.


Trump's 15-Point Capitulation Draft​

The strategic resilience of Iran's posture is highlighted by its rejection of U.S. diplomatic proposals. President Trump recently transmitted a 15-point ceasefire proposal through a Pakistani mediator.

Tehran rejected the draft, characterizing it as a capitulation document:

  • Ineffective pressure: The proposal demanded the surrender of Iran's enriched uranium and the dismantling of its ballistic programs.
  • Ignored realities: The draft was compiled under the assumption that U.S. airstrikes had broken Iran's will, ignoring the successful penetration of Iranian missiles near Dimona and Haifa.
  • No concessions: Iran's leadership refused to sign any agreement that did not include the immediate lifting of all economic sanctions and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf.

Conclusion: The Calculations of the Unopened Box​

The joint Mossad-AMAN and Western assessments confirm that the current phase of the war is only a prelude. By maintaining its most advanced systems—including the Shahed-238, the Haj Qasem missile, and the Abu Mahdi ASCM networks—in reserve, Iran has established a strategic baseline.

The U.S. and Israel can continue to execute conventional strikes on secondary targets, but they cannot eliminate the threat of the unopened box. If the conflict transitions from a low-intensity war of attrition to a full-scale confrontation, the deployment of these unactivated reserves will redefine the strategic reality of the Middle East, exposing the limitations of Western air defense systems and the fragility of the global economy.