Intel Clash: Mossad & AMAN Debunk Trump's Iran Plan
A joint assessment compiled by Israel's foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, and Military Intelligence (AMAN) has challenged President Trump's expectation of an immediate collapse of the Iranian regime. The secret report, detailed by Maariv's military correspondent Abi Ashkenazi, states that military strikes alone cannot depose the clerical leadership in Tehran. Instead, Mossad chief David Barnea and AMAN commanders outline a post-war subversion campaign requiring at least one year and substantial financial backing from Gulf monarchies to achieve regime change. The document exposes a growing divide between U.S. political expectations and Israeli intelligence realities.

The Intelligence Rift: Debunking Immediate Collapse
The joint publication from AMAN and Mossad marks a significant shift. While Netanyahu has translated the war's objectives into immediate regime change to satisfy Washington's political timeline, the Israeli intelligence community has issued a formal correction.
According to the intelligence assessment, any expectation that the current military campaign will lead to a spontaneous, immediate collapse or surrender of the Iranian state is incorrect. The Mossad and AMAN assert that the regime's internal command structures remain intact, and that the initial weeks of bombardment have failed to trigger the popular rebellion that Trump's advisors anticipated.
The One-Year Subversion Strategy
Instead of immediate collapse, Mossad's David Barnea outlines a phased, long-term subversion campaign designed to begin after a ceasefire is established:
- CEASEFIRE PHASE: Stop direct military exchanges to relieve pressure on Israeli infrastructure.
- ECONOMIC PRESSURES: Reinstate maximum economic blockade while covertly funding internal labor strikes and pension protests.
- GULF FUNDING: Utilize financial structures in the UAE and other Gulf states to fund local opposition networks and coordinate exiled political platforms.
- COVERT OPERATIVES: Accelerate targeted assassinations of key IRGC coordinators inside Iran.
The intelligence agencies estimate that this campaign will require at least one year of sustained operations to fracture the regime's security apparatus.
The Institutional Vulnerability: Iran vs. North Korea
The assessment makes a critical distinction between different authoritarian systems. While Western media often describes Iran as a totalitarian state, Israeli intelligence notes that the Islamic Republic possesses institutional competition that North Korea lacks:
- Elections and Offices: The existence of a presidency, parliament, and competing factions (reformists vs. conservatives) creates internal friction.
- Factional Seams: Because the system is not completely hermetic, it can be infiltrated. Factional rivalries provide seams where covert operations can exploit internal divisions.
- North Korean Comparison: If Iran were a completely closed, totalitarian dynasty like North Korea, subversion would be impossible. The current system's partial openness is its primary vulnerability.
Trump's Five-Day Pause: A Strategic Ladder
The Mossad assessment views Trump's announcement of a five-day suspension of planned strikes on Iranian power grids as a political maneuver. The pause is seen as a "small ladder" designed to allow the U.S. President to climb down from his previous, unfulfilled ultimatum regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
The U.S. plan to deploy 50,000 troops to the region by Saturday is a show of force, but military commanders recognize the limits of this deployment. A full ground invasion remains unfeasible, and the U.S. administration is searching for a diplomatic exit that can be framed as a political victory.
The Red Lines: Minimal U.S. Demands
According to Israeli intelligence, the U.S. cannot end the current campaign without securing three key concessions from Tehran to justify the deployment:
- Enriched Uranium: The immediate removal or transfer of Iran's stockpile of 450 kg of highly enriched uranium to a third country.
- Hormuz Guarantees: A formal, internationally monitored commitment to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to all global trade.
- Ballistic Monitoring: The establishment of a verification mechanism to limit the development and export of Iranian ballistic missiles.
If Trump attempts to exit the campaign without these achievements—relying on a face-saving, limited strike on a single fuel tank or transformer—Israel warns it will continue its own independent strikes, forcing the U.S. to remain involved.
Negotiating with the Hardliners: The Rise of Ghalibaf
The U.S. attempt to establish a negotiating track has encountered a structural challenge. The U.S. has concluded that reformists like President Pezeshkian do not possess the authority to make final decisions regarding war and peace.
Instead, the U.S. is focusing its backchannel pressure on Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Ghalibaf has emerged as the most powerful figure managing the state's military-political coordination. The U.S. strategy is to use Israel's military threats to pressure Ghalibaf and the conservative establishment into a deal, recognizing that if the hardliners sign a treaty, the reformist faction will implement it without resistance.
The Sidelining of Reformists: Lessons from the 12-Day War
Israeli intelligence has expressed frustration with the role of Iranian reformists. The AMAN report notes that the previous "12-Day War" was halted primarily due to the diplomatic opening provided by Pezeshkian's faction.
From Israel's perspective, halting that war was a strategic error:
- The Unfinished Fight: Had the 12-Day War continued, it would have remained a bilateral Israel-Iran exchange, allowing Israel to target Iran's infrastructure without involving the U.S. or risking global energy grids.
- Increased Cost: By pausing the conflict, Iran was given time to deploy its advanced solid-fuel missiles (like the Kheibar Shekan), raising the cost of the current war beyond acceptable limits.
Israel's Target: Removing Ghalibaf to Force Chaos
While the U.S. wants to pressure Ghalibaf to secure a deal, Israel's objective is to remove him. Israeli planners argue that targeting Ghalibaf would collapse the regime's institutional structure, creating a power vacuum prior to any proposed elections.
Under this plan, the removal of the conservative leadership would allow the U.S. and Israel to install an exiled figurehead (such as Reza Pahlavi) as a transitional authority. However, Mossad and AMAN warn that executing this plan during active hostilities is impossible; it requires the cessation of direct missile exchanges to allow local opposition networks to organize.
Conclusion: The Limits of Military Subversion
The joint Mossad-AMAN assessment exposes the divergence between Washington's search for an immediate deal and Tel Aviv's insistence on long-term subversion.
As Netanyahu attempts to hold Trump to his military promises, his own intelligence community has confirmed that bombs cannot change a regime. The road to changing Iran runs not through a rapid, three-week campaign, but through a long-term, Gulf-funded campaign of internal subversion. By exposing the limits of military force, Mossad and AMAN have signaled that the war has reached its political limits, and that the battle for Iran will be fought in the shadows of the post-ceasefire landscape.
