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Radar Blown: Drone Destroys Saudi AN/FPS-117 Near Qaisumah

· 4 min read
Khalid Naami
Founder, Owner, and CEO at Dashboard Options

A targeted IRGC suicide drone strike has destroyed a strategic Saudi AN/FPS-117 early warning radar near Qaisumah in northeastern Saudi Arabia. The strike, occurring on March 7, 2026, has bypassed the Kingdom's multi-layered air defense grid and created a significant blind spot in its northeastern early warning corridor. The targeting of Saudi assets highlights the vulnerability of regional military infrastructure that supports U.S. air operations following the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford.

Radar Blown: Drone Destroys Saudi AN/FPS-117 Near Qaisumah


The Strike: Blinding the Peace Shield Network near Qaisumah​

The strike took place in the early hours near the border town of Qaisumah, close to the military staging zone of Hafar al-Batin. A single Iranian-manufactured suicide drone, operating at low altitude, bypassed local radar detection systems.

The drone directly targeted the rotating array of the active AN/FPS-117 radar station. The impact and subsequent explosion destroyed the transmitter-receiver modules, disabling the station. The loss of this node blinds the early warning coverage that monitors the airspace bordering Iraq and Iran.


Technical Profile of the AN/FPS-117 AESA Radar​

The AN/FPS-117, produced by Lockheed Martin, is a 3D long-range, L-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Key technical features include:

  • Operational Range: Provides continuous 3D tracking of aircraft, drones, and ballistic missiles at distances up to 470 kilometers.
  • Electronic Countermeasures: Utilizes 18-channel frequency hopping to maintain search capabilities under intense electronic jamming.
  • Global Standard: The system is the standard long-range surveillance radar used by the U.S. and Canada for northern warning systems, and is operated by Germany (RRP-117) and the UK (Type 92).

The targeting of the Qaisumah radar is linked to U.S. operations. With the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford withdrawn to Souda Bay due to structural damage from a 30-hour fire, the Pentagon relocated its carrier-based F-35C and F-15E strike fighters to Prince Sultan Airbase (PSAB) in central Saudi Arabia.

To support these jets and coordinate refueling tanker paths, Saudi Arabia activated its "Peace Shield" (درع السلام) radar network, sharing real-time tracking data with U.S. forces. By disabling the early warning sensors that protect the northern corridor, the IRGC has made U.S. operations out of PSAB more vulnerable.


Complicity Disclosed: Trump’s Claims of Gulf Cooperation​

While Saudi officials have maintained a public stance of neutrality, declaring that their airspace is not used for offensive operations, Donald Trump challenged this narrative. During his public addresses, Trump stated that Gulf nations are actively facilitating U.S. strikes.

This public disclosure turned Saudi air defense installations into military targets. The IRGC has argued that by utilizing the Peace Shield network to coordinate and protect U.S. jets striking Iranian territory, Saudi Arabia has integrated its defense infrastructure into the coalition's campaign, justifying retaliatory strikes.


Depleting the Peace Shield: Impact on Northeastern Airspace​

Before the current conflict, the Royal Saudi Air Force operated a fleet of 17 AN/FPS-117 units as the backbone of its Peace Shield air defense network. The latest strike, following a similar attack on a eastern-sector radar, means at least two units have been destroyed, leaving 15 operational.

Because these radars are static, replacing them requires years of logistics and procurement. The destruction of the Qaisumah station leaves the northeastern border—historically a sensitive sector since the Gulf War—exposed to low-altitude drone and cruise missile penetration.


The Regional Pattern: Systematically Targeting Air Defense Hubs​

The strike on the Saudi radar is part of a regional pattern targeting coalition air defense systems. To prepare corridors for ballistic missile salvos, regional forces have systematically targeted early warning and interceptor batteries:

  • Jordan: A U.S.-operated THAAD launcher was targeted and disabled.
  • United Arab Emirates: Two THAAD launcher complexes were hit by precision drones.
  • Saudi Arabia: The destruction of the AN/FPS-117 near Qaisumah blinds the radar envelope that feeds into Saudi Patriot batteries.

Conclusion: The Vulnerability of Joint Defense Operations​

The drone strike destroying the AN/FPS-117 radar near Qaisumah highlights the difficulty of protecting static early warning installations from low-altitude threats. By targeting the nodes that sustain U.S. flight corridors, the IRGC has shown that Gulf air defense networks can be penetrated.

As Saudi Arabia manages the gaps in its northeastern radar coverage and U.S. forces adjust their flight paths, the limits of the Peace Shield are clear. The vulnerability of these early warning stations suggests that regional cooperation with U.S. military operations carries high security risks, exposing domestic infrastructure to retaliatory strikes.